Ta Moan Thom temple in Oddar Meanchey province's Banteay Ampil district in February. Nhoem Sideth via FB
On June 16, the Bangkok Post reported on a lecture by Professor Surakiart Sathirathai, former Thai Foreign Minister, titled “Border Row ‘Ploy to Divert Attention’.” Professor Surakiart alleged that Cambodia deliberately stokes border tensions to distract from its domestic economic and political difficulties. This claim not only lacks evidence but also misrepresents the complex and painful history of Cambodia–Thailand border disputes.
Framing Cambodia as the provocateur manipulating nationalist sentiment for political gain distorts historical and legal realities. Viewed through regional history, international law and Thailand’s entrenched political divisions, a more intricate reality emerges — one revealing how Thailand’s internal fractures have repeatedly spilled over its borders.
The flashpoints in this dispute are neither new nor genuinely contested in legal or historical terms. Temples such as Preah Vihear, Ta Moan Thom and Ta Krabei — all clearly within Cambodia’s sovereign territory — have long been mischaracterised as disputed due to their border proximity. The flare-ups in 2008 and 2011 were products not of Cambodian encroachment but of Thailand’s internal political turmoil, where nationalist factions revived unfounded territorial claims to redirect public discontent.
The matter was taken to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which ruled in Cambodia’s favour in 2013, reaffirming a decision dating back to 1962. The ICJ judgment, grounded in international law and historical evidence, left no ambiguity: the disputed area belongs to Cambodia.
To portray Cambodia’s defence of its sovereignty as a political distraction misunderstands the core principles of statehood. Border disputes transcend politics — they touch on national identity, historical justice and the rule of law.
Thailand — not Cambodia — has consistently refused to accept legal resolutions. Cambodia has expressed its intention to submit disputes over Ta Moan Tauch, Ta Moan Thom and Ta Krabei temples, as well as the Mum Bei area to the ICJ, yet Bangkok has rejected the court’s jurisdiction. This reluctance suggests an unwillingness to accept rulings that may not align with Thailand’s preferred narrative or territorial ambition.
If Cambodia truly sought to escalate tensions, it would avoid international institutions. Instead, its repeated appeals to the ICJ reflect a commitment to legal principles and multilateral engagement, not opportunism.
Professor Surakiart’s analysis also overlooks a recurring pattern in Thai politics: externalising internal conflict. As tensions rise between conservative royalists and populist factions, Cambodia becomes a convenient scapegoat. Accusing a smaller neighbour diverts attention from Thailand’s domestic issues — stalled reforms, weakened democratic institutions and growing inequality. The nationalism invoked is manufactured for political gain, not a spontaneous outburst.
Contrary to claims that Prime Minister Hun Manet uses the conflict to stir nationalism and consolidate power, his public statements have urged restraint, peace and respect toward Thailand.
Cambodia has not initiated military escalation. Its border posture remains defensive, shaped entirely by Thailand’s provocative rhetoric and threats of invasion. Cambodia continues to pursue peaceful solutions through the Joint Border Committee and international adjudication.
A glaring omission in Professor Surakiart’s narrative is Thailand’s recent economic pressure tactics. Thailand has closed border checkpoints, restricted trade, threatened to cut electricity and internet services, and even threatened to expel Cambodian migrant workers — actions that harm both economies and put regional stability at risk.
To depict Cambodia as the destabiliser while ignoring these aggressive policies is misleading and verges on propaganda.
At its core, the Cambodia – Thailand border issue poses a fundamental question: Will disputes be resolved through law, dialogue, and diplomacy — or through nationalist posturing, political manoeuvring, or even the threat of force?
Cambodia has consistently chosen the former. Thailand, despite its regional leadership aspirations, often opts for the latter.
It is easier to blame a neighbour than confront internal challenges. But lasting peace and regional stability require both nations to recommit to international norms and constructive dialogue — starting with moving beyond blame and facing the facts.
Khemrak Rath is a Phnom Penh-based political analyst. The views and opinions expressed are his own.
