In 2025, the global geopolitical landscape remains highly uncertain. The competition for influence between great powers — particularly the US and China — is growing more intense. Ongoing conflicts and state rivalries mark this turbulent period, pushing the international system toward fragmentation and the rise of competing blocs. These developments pose serious challenges to small and medium states like Cambodia, which must adopt careful foreign policy strategies, especially when considering participation in regional or global alliances.

In recent years, Cambodia and China have expanded their bilateral cooperation. Notably, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Phnom Penh in April 2025, following the “Year of People-to-People Exchanges” in 2024 and the launch of the “Diamond Hexagonal Cooperation Framework” in early 2023. These developments reflect the growing importance of China-Cambodia ties.

As China prepares to host the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, it has shown appreciation for Cambodia’s role in the organisation. Cambodia has held dialogue partner status with the SCO for over a decade. Now, the question arises: should Cambodia maintain this status, upgrade to observer or seek full membership? As competition between China and the US intensifies, Beijing is encouraging Cambodia to take a more active role.

SCO and China: Long-term goals and regional strategy

The organisation was initially formed on in April 1996 and formally established in 2001 by 6 founding members: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its original goals included countering terrorism, enhancing border security, promoting political ties and fostering economic cooperation. 

Today, the SCO includes nine full members, which together account for roughly 20% of global GDP. Additionally, there are 3 observer states — Mongolia, Belarus and Afghanistan (currently inactive) — and 14 dialogue partners, including Cambodia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Nepal, Armenia, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Maldives and the United Arab Emirates.

From a Chinese perspective, the SCO has always served a strategic purpose. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initially saw it as a way to prevent support for separatism in Xinjiang from newly independent Central Asian countries. Over time, the SCO’s mission evolved to include maintaining regional stability, countering US influence, securing energy access and expanding China's influence across Asia, while eliminating separatism, extremism and terrorism.

According to Thong Mengdavid, a lecturer at the Institute for International Studies and Public Policy at the Royal University of Phnom Penh, “China's long-term goal is to expand its regional influence, particularly through soft power. This includes economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and strengthening people-to-people ties with Southeast Asian countries. One key strategy is to counterbalance US influence in the region”.

He added that China's growing engagement through the SCO also aims to contain regional tensions, including those in the South China Sea, Taiwan and the East China Sea.

As of 2023, China has used the SCO to expand its influence in Asia by tackling what it terms the “three evils” — terrorism, extremism and separatism — while promoting stability, pandemic response and regional development. 

“To achieve this, China has introduced multiple frameworks including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI) and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). These represent a long-term strategy to entrench China’s influence in Central and Southeast Asia,” added Mengdavid.

“China is a rising power striving to displace the US as the world’s leading superpower. To achieve this, it must build alliances and multilateral mechanisms to expand its influence,” added Kin Phea, director-general of the International Relations Institute of Cambodia under the Royal Academy of Cambodia.

He suggested that the SCO may evolve into a NATO-style organization — China’s alternative to Western-led security frameworks.

“While the SCO may not yet rival US influence in Southeast Asia, it does provide China with tools to broaden its regional presence. It gives Southeast Asian countries an alternative option — but not necessarily a replacement — for Western partnerships,” he shared.

China’s SCO outreach in Southeast Asia

Only Cambodia and Myanmar are official SCO dialogue partners in Southeast Asia. Cambodia joined in 2015, and Myanmar followed in 2023. Other countries like Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have engaged with SCO events but have not pursued formal roles. According to Laos media reports, Laos applied for dialogue partner status in 2024.

“Few Southeast Asian countries see the SCO as crucial. This is not due to a lack of economic or energy potential, but because ASEAN countries are wary of how joining the SCO may affect their ties with existing dialogue partners like the US and Australia. Also, China and ASEAN already maintain strong bilateral relations, so additional mechanisms are not seen as urgent,” added Seng Vanly, a regional affairs researcher and PhD candidate at China Foreign Affairs University.

Cambodia and the SCO: A strategic hedging approach

Since joining the SCO as a dialogue partner in 2015, Cambodia has used this platform as part of its broader foreign policy to balance between global powers. It has expressed interest in obtaining observer status, a move seen as part of a hedging strategy — engaging China without sacrificing relations with the West. However, this engagement is not without its complexities, as Cambodia has been careful with its alignment with the SCO against its traditional relationships with Western powers and its obligations within ASEAN.

Cambodia’s strategic location and development goals make the SCO an attractive platform for economic cooperation. The SCO covers nearly 40% of the world’s population — largely due to China and India — and accounts for 20% of global GDP.

SCO initiatives in regional connectivity, trade corridors and energy cooperation align with Cambodia’s economic goals. Participating in SCO economic dialogues could facilitate the export of Cambodian agricultural products, textiles and other goods to Central Asia, Russia and beyond. It may also open avenues for collaboration in energy and technology, and even access to SCO financial mechanisms. 

 “When it comes to Cambodia's potential membership in the SCO, the first goal is to gain political support, and the second is to gain international support. Generally, this is part of global diplomacy, where a country with many friends, especially one involved in multiple multilateral engagements, tends to receive support,” observed Vanly.

“Economic pressures, such as issues like EBA and GSP, have led to decisions and considerations by those who shape Cambodia's policies,” he added.

Should Cambodia go deeper with the SCO?

China’s support for Cambodia’s observer status is part of a broader strategy to bolster its presence in Southeast Asia and promote multilateralism. The SCO is one of several platforms China uses to promote a multi-polar world order — one less dependent on Western-led institutions such as NATO or the G7, and promote its vision of regional cooperation based on shared security and economic interests.

Cambodia appears receptive to deepening ties. In an interview with a local media outlet, foreign ministry spokesperson Chum Sounry noted that since becoming a dialogue partner in 2015, Cambodia has actively promoted ASEAN-SCO cooperation and is now seeking observer status. 

This move is framed not as a shift in allegiance, but as a calibrated policy that aligns with ASEAN’s neutral and cooperative posture, an effort that underscores its intent to deepen engagement with Eurasian powers without undermining its ASEAN commitments. This approach allows Cambodia to benefit from the SCO's economic, security and strategic initiatives, particularly those led by China and Russia, while still aligning with ASEAN's cooperative and neutral posture.

He added that former Prime Minister Hun Sen also reaffirmed Cambodia’s willingness to follow SCO procedures to secure observer status, suggesting that deeper integration is being pursued deliberately.

However, foreign minister Prak Sokhonn has previously acknowledged that Cambodia’s growing ties with China — especially through the BRI — raise concerns within ASEAN. Countries like Vietnam and Indonesia remain cautious about China's influence in the region. 

To manage these dynamics, Cambodia has emphasised non-military SCO cooperation — such as on cyber threats and the combating of transnational crimes — while avoiding activities that would suggest it is aligning too closely with a single bloc. This careful balancing act reflects Cambodia's strategy of maintaining its strategic autonomy while fostering regional stability within ASEAN.

One researcher who preferred anonymity put it thus.

“Cambodia tries to maintain good relations with China but doesn’t prioritise the SCO unless Beijing pushes for more involvement. If China asks, Cambodia becomes active. If not, we stay passive,” he suggested.

Conclusion: Caution in an age of strategic competition

Looking ahead, Cambodia’s engagement with the SCO is likely to remain measured and gradual. The Kingdom’s key priorities — economic development, regional stability and foreign policy flexibility — suggest that it will continue to engage where SCO cooperation aligns with national interest, such as infrastructure, non-traditional security and trade.

While full membership remains unlikely in the short term due to the risk of entangling Cambodia in competition between the major powers, observer status provides a middle path. It allows Cambodia to deepen strategic cooperation with Eurasian powers, particularly China and Russia, without compromising its ASEAN commitments or relations with the West.

In an increasingly divided world, Cambodia’s strength lies in its ability to hedge, diversify and adapt — without taking sides too soon.

Chandara Samban is an independent researcher based in Cambodia with strong interests in foreign affairs and security issues. He is also a Cambodian correspondent for The ASEAN Frontier (TAF). The views and opinions expressed are his own.